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 ‘Remember me’: Hamlet, Memory and Bloom’s Poiesis 
Nicholas Taylor-Collins 
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Nicholas Taylor-Collins is postdoctoral associate in the Department of English and CLS at the 
University of Warwick. He is preparing his monograph on William Shakespeare, memory and modern 
Irish literature, as well as a co-edited collection of essays on Shakespeare and Contemporary Irish 
Writing. He has previously published articles on John McGahern and Shakespeare. 
‘Remember me’: Hamlet, Memory and Bloom’s Poiesis 
Although memory is not explicitly named in “Hades”, it nonetheless features centrally. 
Intertextuality is an example of memory, and in “Hades” Shakespeare’s Hamlet is 
remembered – specifically the Ghost’s relation to Hamlet, whom he bids to 
‘Remember’ and ‘revenge’. Derrida calls this relation ‘hauntological’: it is 
characterised by an uncertain gaze, the father telling his son what to do, and the son 
mourning for his father. In Bloom’s mourning for his father, Virag, hauntology might 
be expected. However, it is Bloom’s late son, Rudy, who hauntologizes Bloom, thereby 
revitalising the latter; this adjusts Shakespeare’s original hauntology. While 
considering repeatable ways of maintaining this hauntology, Bloom jocularly reverts to 
new technology: the phonograph and photograph. His plan reveals his relish for 
liminality and poiesis: being and non-being at the same time. Bloom is thus 
remembered into the future, all the while Ulysses is haunted by Hamlet. 
Keywords: William Shakespeare, James Joyce, Hamlet, Ulysses, “Hades”, memory, 
hauntology 
Though “Hades”, the sixth episode of Ulysses, treats the dead most directly of all the chapters 
in the novel, that does not necessarily mean that it engages with memory explicitly. As Table 
1 demonstrates, whilst in Ulysses there is a high preponderance of words in the lexical field 
of ‘memory’, few of them appear in “Hades”. In fact, the word ‘remember’, which occurs in 
every chapter, appears nine times in each of “Sirens”, “Circe” and “Penelope”. Fourth on the 
list is “Lestrygonians”, with “Hades” joint with “Nausicaa” in equal fifth (see Table 2). If 
only Bloom’s chapters are considered,1 then “Hades” languishes in fourth, still far below 
where it might be expected to rank. [insert Table 1] 
These results should not be correlated with Ulysses’ intertextuality. The episode 
‘Scylla and Charybdis’ is well known as the ‘Shakespeare’ chapter, with Stephen talking 
about and frequently remembering Shakespeare’s texts. And yet, it only uses the word 
‘remember’ twice, showing how intertextual ‘memory’ should not only be thought of as 
explicit, but discernible in the implicit and subtle.2 The texts ‘remembered’ also contribute to 
Ulysses’ ‘structure of feeling’ – the ‘practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and 
interrelating continuity’.3 The same goes for memory more generally: a text such as Ulysses 
that experiments with a range of narrative techniques, including stream of consciousness and 
interior monologue, somewhat forgoes other conventions of memory such as prefacing 
flashbacks or indicating indirect or reported speech. In short, memory in Ulysses should not 
be considered restricted to these common signs that indicate that ‘remembering is taking 
place’. [insert Table 2] 
Instead, it is as Nicholas Royle describes: 
It is a question, then, of phantom texts – textual phantoms which do not necessarily have 
the solidity or objectivity of a quotation, an intertext or explicit, acknowledged presence 
and which do not in fact come to rest anywhere. Phantom texts are fleeting, continually 
moving on, leading us away, like Hamlet’s Ghost, to some other scene[.]4 
The notion of phantom texts allows me to say that, in fact, remembering is taking place in 
“Hades”, and I will show below how “Hades” models the way that ‘remembering’ takes place 
across Ulysses entirely. As in Royle’s analysis – but in fact, even more so – in “Hades” 
memory is just like the Ghost of Hamlet. I will show that memory in “Hades” comes 
modelled directly by Hamlet’s Ghost. 
“Hades” charts Bloom’s journey from the centre of Dublin to Prospect Cemetery in 
the city’s northwest quadrant. He attends the funeral of Paddy Dignam, and the journey, the 
service and the burial all prompt memories, both voluntary and involuntary, of people and 
events to flood Bloom’s consciousness. 
One idea that “Hades” remembers is similar stories in classical epics. Bloom travels 
in a carriage with three other Dubliners – Martin Cunningham, Jack Power and Simon 
Dedalus – from Sandymount to Glasnevin. In the process the carriage crosses the four 
waterways in Dublin – the River Dodder, the Grand Canal, the River Liffey and the Royal 
Canal – thereby mimicking the epic trope of the ἡ νέκυια, the nekuya or descent into hell.5 
Odysseus’ descent into hell in The Odyssey, as with Aeneas in The Aeneid, requires him to 
cross the four waterways of Hades, the underworld. Maurice Halbwachs argues that ‘The 
“Nekuya,” […] provides a background against which we can more clearly discern both 
Olympus with its misty lights and a society of men who are above all lovers of life’.6 As with 
Odysseus, Bloom’s journey to the cemetery exposes him as a ‘lover[] of life’, though ‘no 
external wisdom guides him’.7 By placing “Hades” as direct descendent of these previous 
nekuyas, the text remembers The Odyssey and The Aeneid even as Bloom’s narrative departs 
from theirs. The text invites its readers to compare Bloom with Odysseus – as does the novel 
as a whole – and Aeneas, the founder of a new civilisation. Aeneas is an outsider who carries 
relics of the old gods – remembrances, that is – from Troy into Italy in order to lay the 
foundations for the next great civilisation of men. The implication is that Bloom is their 
descendant, carrying their legacy in Dublin. 
The text obviously invites these connections; however, other memories and ghosts 
that irrupt into the text – including Bloom’s father, Rudolph Virag’s, death and inquest, to 
Bloom’s son’s imagined eleven-year-old existence – should also be considered. In this 
article, I take Bloom’s relationship to memory as a signal representation of how memories of 
the dead underpin a character’s continued living. I will show how it is not merely a structural 
force of death energising life. More than this, memories of death transform Bloom into a 
figure who pursues more vestiges of the dead – Bloom considers saving the dead from death 
in a quasi-life residing in technology. These memories become characterised by ποίησις, 
poiesis. Bloom’s lust for life, therefore, is no ordinary energy, but tends towards 
transformation, creation and liminality. It has a forebear in one of Ulysses’ chief intertexts: 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. I will show how in “Hades”, Bloom and not Stephen is the descendant 
of Hamlet and the latter’s ontological interests, particularly as they are driven by memory – 
the Ghost’s injunction to ‘remember me’ – and find a voice of poetic sensibility in 
technology (the record and the photograph). I will show that to ‘remember’ successfully is to 
relish being haunted by liminal beings, and to adopt an attitude to life that values perpetual 
regeneration, poiesis. Achieving this, Bloom thereby remembers Hamlet – the play par 
excellence that proves the importance of memory in literature. 
I will first explain Hamlet as a play of memory, before describing Jacques Derrida’s 
reading of hauntology in the play. I then examine hauntology in relation to Bloom in 
“Hades”, before establishing that Bloom, like Hamlet, is vitally enhanced by the ghost of a 
dead loved one. In place of Hamlet’s father’s spirit, Bloom is compelled to life by the future-
memorial ghost of his late son, Rudy. I finally show that Bloom begins to appreciate the 
presence of the dead in his life, imagining scenarios in which they can be brought back to 
quasi-life through the use of technology. My conclusion is that Bloom’s more positive 
outlook on life, following his encounters with the dead, endows him with a mind that 
‘remembers poetically’ – though not writing poetry, Bloom is conditioned by poiesis, a 
sensibility that privileges liminality and potentiality.  
Hamlet’s Memories 
Hamlet is a play of memory. Even prior to meeting the Ghost, Hamlet is proud to wear the 
mourning weeds to signal his bereavement for his father.8 By Act One Scene Five, this 
memory play is spurred on by the Ghost’s explicit injunction to Hamlet: ‘Adieu, adieu, adieu, 
remember me.’(I.V.91) This compels Hamlet to erase his commonplace book, ‘My tables! 
Meet it is I set it down’ (I.V.107), perhaps through a Ramist strategy for learning that has 
memory at its heart.9 As the play unfolds, Hamlet’s bid to ‘Revenge his [father’s] foul and 
unnatural murder’ (I.V.25) is inextricably tied to Hamlet’s memory of the Ghost. When 
Hamlet speaks with Gertrude in her closet, the Ghost returns to make sure that Hamlet is on 
the right path to vengeance: ‘Do not forget! This visitation / Is but to whet thy almost blunted 
purpose’ (III.IV.107–8; my emphasis). Evidently, remembering and revenging amount to the 
same thing for Hamlet. There is no Hamlet without memory. 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida offers another reading of the Ghost’s relationship to 
Hamlet. Under the category ‘hauntology’ (which plays with ‘ontology’ in its French 
pronunciation), Derrida likewise considers the connection between Hamlet and the Ghost as 
integral to the drama. The absolute singularity of the coming of the Ghost – the 
inexplicability of the Ghost’s presence suggests it is a singular event, therefore happening 
both for the first and last time10 – leads Derrida to label it ‘Staging for the end of history’: 
Let us call it a hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more 
powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being (of the ‘to be,’ assuming that it is a 
matter of Being in the ‘to be or not to be,’ but nothing is less certain). It would harbor 
within itself, but like circumscribed places or particular effects, eschatology and 
teleology themselves. It would comprehend them, but incomprehensibly. How to 
comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse about the end? Can the 
extremity of the extreme ever he comprehended? And the opposition between ‘to be’ and 
‘not to be’? Hamlet already began with the expected return of the dead King. After the 
end of history, the spirit comes by coming back [revenant]. It figures both a dead man 
who comes back and a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again.11 
Hauntology is greater than ontology, and refers to the singularity of the encounter with the 
spectral Ghost, despite the Ghost’s prior appearance: the paradoxical repetition of the 
singularity. Hauntology also refers to the question ‘To be, or not to be?’ (III.I.55), and 
therefore also the Ghost’s being or non-being. 
Moreover, for my purposes hauntology is constituted by three ideas emerging from 
the actual encounters with the Ghost. These are (1) the ‘visor effect’, which includes a 
‘spectral asymmetry’; (2) the ‘anachrony’ which ‘makes the law’; and, (3) the work of 
mourning which would seem to act as counter to the first two, though actually reinforces the 
work that the Ghost can achieve.12 I will take each of these in turn to show their importance 
to my argument about memory in Hamlet. After, I will show how they are crucial to Bloom’s 
trip to Glasnevin Cemetery. 
Hamlet’s hauntology 
The ‘visor effect’ derives from a simple concept: the observer(s) of the spectre – Marcellus, 
Barnardo, Horatio or Hamlet – cannot see the spectre looking back at them. This is owing to 
the armed Ghost, whose visor is semi-permeable to sight: 
The armor lets one see nothing of the spectral body, but at the level of the head and 
beneath the visor, it permits the so-called father to see and to speak. Some slits are cut 
into it and adjusted so as to permit him to see without being seen, but to speak in order to 
be heard. The helmet, like the visor, did not merely offer protection: it topped off the coat 
of arms and indicated the chief’s authority, like the blazon of his nobility.13 
Authority is visible onstage, so the Ghost’s clothing denotes someone of a high, if not the 
highest, rank. Furthermore, the authority is what allows the Ghost to restrict this visibility or 
ocularity: the visor does not let the observers see that the Ghost is looking at the observers. 
Here is the spectral asymmetry of which Derrida writes. 
The ability to identify the Ghost is central to Hamlet. He asks Horatio with 
successive, stichomythic questions: ‘Armed, say you? […] From top to toe? […] What 
looked he, frowningly? […] Pale, or red? […] And fixed his eyes upon you? (I.II.225–33) 
The energetic questions climax with Hamlet’s final inquiry in this sequence asking whether 
the Ghost looked at Horatio. The question of identity is resolved on the premise that the 
Ghost did look at Horatio, and that look confirmed the Ghost’s appearance. Hamlet’s next 
comment that ‘I would I had been there’ (I.II.34), reveals that he is satisfied as to the Ghost’s 
identity. 
It can be argued, however, that whilst ocularity is important to Hamlet, Derrida places 
too great an emphasis on the visor. This is especially true since, between the second and third 
of these questions, Hamlet makes an assertion that Horatio rebuffs: 
HAMLET Then you saw not his face. 
HORATIO O yes, my lord, he wore his beaver up. (I.II.227–8) 
Despite this obvious proof that the Ghost was able to avoid the semi-permeable problem of 
the visor and its slits, Derrida persists in focusing on the ‘visor effect’. To counter this 
complaint, he adds that 
Even when [the visor] is raised, in fact, its possibility continues to signify that someone, 
beneath the armor, can safely see without being seen or without being identified. Even 
when it is raised, the visor remains, an available resource and structure, solid and stable 
as armor […] The helmet effect is not suspended when the visor is raised. Its power, 
namely its possibility, is in that case recalled merely in a more intensely dramatic 
fashion.14 
The visor effect and its subsequent spectral asymmetry – of ocularity and of power – is all the 
more effective because of its potentiality: even when it is not in play, it threatens to reassert 
itself. This threat renders the spectral chief, the authoritative Ghost, always ready to ‘see and 
to speak’, and therefore the Ghost’s interlocutor must always be ready to listen to it without 
interruption. In effect, the visor effect turns the spectre into a living authority possessing a 
living voice able to bend others to its will. The envoy of the dead can control the stage. 
This is also visible in the second hauntological idea, that of anachrony giving the law. 
When the Ghost speaks and gives his authority some vocal force, then he gives the law. The 
law, coming from a spectre, ‘thy father’s spirit’ (I.V.9), is given by a representative of time 
before the play. The play’s time, which I have already shown is confused owing to the 
repeated singularity of the Ghost’s visit, is again shown to be riven with anachronisms. Or, as 
Hamlet says to Horatio and the others, ‘The time is out of joint’ (I.V.86). The idea of 
anachrony is compounded by another element of the Ghost’s giving the law: the fact it is the 
Ghost of Hamlet’s father. Not only is the law-giver’s spirit dead, but there is a generational 
separation between the law-giver and the legal prosecutor: the father instructs the son what to 
do. The twin injunctions to ‘Revenge’ and ‘remember me’ become inherited laws that must 
be executed by someone who was not victim of their initiating act – King Hamlet’s murder. 
In this, then, Hamlet is actually the Ghost’s play, and not the prince’s. 
The element of Hamlet that appears to counter hauntology is the central idea of 
mourning. Hamlet, of all characters, mourns most obviously in the play, evident from the 
moment he is seen onstage in his mourning weeds, though it is also clear, argues Derrida, in 
Act Five Scene One when Hamlet is taking account of and addressing the skulls of dead 
people. Derrida asserts that mourning ‘consists always in attempting to ontologize remains, to 
make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the 
dead’.15 In the graveyard, Hamlet 
demands to know to whom the grave belongs […]. Nothing could be worse, for the work 
of mourning, than confusion or doubt: one has to know who is buried where – and it is 
necessary (to know – to make certain) that, in what remains of him, he remain there. Let 
him stay there and move no more!16 
This work of mourning is characterised by giving name to, or ‘ontologizing’ the remains of 
the dead, and also of locating them geo-temporally – in their grave and in their right 
temporality of death, and not life. The former leads to the latter, inasmuch as knowing of the 
dead allows Hamlet to detach his living self from their dead remains. 
However, it is clear that the work of mourning is interrupted by the arrival of the 
spectre. Through the visor effect the spectre seeks to destabilise the ability of the observer to 
localize or ontologize the dead – to mourn. The Ghost instead ‘freez[es the] young blood’ 
(I.V.16) of Hamlet. After the Ghost’s threat through spectral asymmetry, Hamlet learns that 
the living cannot control the dead, but in fact that the dead control the living. Moreover, 
Hamlet’s legal framework, which had previously been prescribed by ‘the Everlasting’ and his 
‘canon’ (I.II.131–2), is now upset by the Ghost’s injunctions to revenge and remember. 
Hauntology gives to mourning a hiatus, and denies it its full course. 
Conversely, mourning contests hauntology: the power of those living to establish their 
distance and difference from the dead denies hauntology its full force. Hamlet’s mourning, in 
this vein, acts to exemplify the power of suffering 
     the whips and scorns of time, 
Th’oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely, 
The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay, 
The insolence of office and the spurns 
That patient merit of th’unworthy takes[.] (III.I.69–73) 
However, it must be borne in mind that hauntology casts a shadow over mourning that 
reveals the full living force of grief: mourning contests hauntology, and its power is 
redoubled through that contest. Without the shadow of death, and the threat of the returning 
dead to command the living, the force of mourning is weakened. Thus, hauntology is a 
necessary part of a successful and powerful process of mourning. And since revenging and 
remembering constitute a cornerstone of hauntology in Hamlet, then mourning must also be 
considered both ante and post hoc to those twin acts. Mourning remembers just at the 
moment when it seeks to detach the living from the dead.17 
Hauntology, therefore, is a powerful force for the living – though it comes at a cost. It 
removes Hamlet’s agency from the stage – the law is not his own and he was not victim of 
the murder that instigated the laws to revenge and remember. And it relies on an asymmetry 
that manifests itself in ocularity: Hamlet must learn to trust in not seeing, in not always being 
able to identify the originator of the law. And yet, conversely, hauntology reinforces the 
importance and power of mourning, of ontologizing remains and localizing them in the grave. 
Hauntology both interrupts and expedites mourning. I will now explain the relevance of these 
ideas to Bloom in “Hades”. 
Bloom’s Mourning 
Not unsurprisingly “Hades”, situated in a quasi-mythological underworld and site of afterlife, 
is a chapter coloured by death. R. M. Adams describes how Bloom is ‘haunted throughout the 
chapter by an amazing assortment of ghosts, spooks, and hobgoblin doppelgängers’,18 fearing 
even stories of ghosts returning after death: ‘I will appear to you after death. You will see my 
ghost after death. My ghost will haunt you after death.’19 Memory in the order of 
spectrality,20 as in Hamlet, is conditioned by the encounter of the living with ghosts: the 
anachronistic return of those who do not belong with the living. As Bloom’s journey to and 
through Glasnevin Cemetery progresses, Bloom encounters more ghostly memories of his 
dead loved ones. This leads to Shari Benstock’s comment that ‘Bloom is haunted by the 
ghost of his dead loved ones, is obsessed with his own dead past, is discovering on this day 
that the “spirit” world is very much a part of his everyday life’.21 As I will show, Bloom 
learns to appreciate the community of the dead. 
One of the first ‘ghosts’ to visit Bloom takes the form of an involuntary memory22 
while they are still en route to the cemetery. It is the memory of his father, Virag’s, death. 
 That afternoon of the inquest. The redlabelled bottle on the table. The room in the 
hotel with hunting pictures. Stuffy it was. Sunlight through the slats of the Venetian 
blind. The coroner’s sunlit ears, big and hairy. Boots giving evidence. Thought he was 
asleep first. Then saw like yellow streaks on his face. Had slipped down to the foot of the 
bed. Verdict: overdose. Death by misadventure. The letter. For my son Leopold. 
 No more pain. Wake no more. Nobody owns. (6.359–65) 
It would seem that this is hauntology in the mode of Hamlet: the father appearing to the son. 
For example, as in Derrida’s description of mourning in Hamlet, Bloom also uses the 
memory as an archaeological dig for ascertaining knowledge. Bloom first locates the memory 
geo-temporally, not only the deictic ‘that’ indicating elsewhere from the carriage, but also in 
the ‘afternoon’. The text then describes the coroner’s room through the vignetted ‘redlabelled 
bottle’, the ‘hunting pictures’ and the ‘Sunlight’ illuminating the coroner’s ‘ears, big and 
hairy’. Then the porter, ‘Boots’ is brokenly recalled ‘giving evidence’ of finding Virag dead. 
Aside from the ‘Stuffy’ coroner’s room, all descriptions are images irrupting into Bloom’s 
mind. Like a zoetrope, Bloom’s memory of the inquest consists of a series of disparate 
images strung together consecutively in a disruptive fashion that never fully erases the joins 
between the images. The static sequence, with only an imperfect hint towards dynamic 
movement, offers a version of the asymmetrical ocularity originating in Hamlet. 
However, this father-son encounter circumvents hauntology and fails to hauntologize 
Bloom, despite the similarities. As such, the element of authoritative control evident in 
Hamlet does not continue in Ulysses: here, Bloom alone is able to see the revenant memory, 
and any authoritative speech is markedly missing. Even Boots’ evidence is related indirectly, 
without any kind of speech marker. In light of this reading, Bloom’s mourning for his father 
is incomplete because, paradoxically, the memory is not strong enough to act as catalyst to 
hasten the end of mourning. Without Virag’s hauntology, Bloom will never have full control 
over his mourning for his father. 
There is the potential vessel for Virag’s authoritative instruction to the son here, in the 
form of the letter. Earlier in “Hades”, Bloom alludes to the letter, noting its most significant 
feature: ‘Be good to [my dog] Athos, Leopold, is my last wish.’ (6.125–6) Though this is an 
odd injunction to pass from father to son, it nonetheless qualifies as inheritance. However, its 
bathetic nature undermines the authority that Virag attempts to impart, thereby undermining 
Virag’s ability to control his son. As if to correct this failure, in ‘Circe’, Ulysses’ fifteenth 
episode, Virag talks to his son while dressed in his own, traditional outfit (much as the Ghost 
did): ‘the long caftan of an elder in Zion and a smokingcap with magenta tassels’ (6.248–9). 
In this exchange between Bloom and the ghost of his father, Virag condemns the past 
behaviour of Bloom. Virag complains that ‘One night they bring you home drunk as dog after 
spend your good money’. Bloom’s reply that it happened ‘Only that once’ fails to console 
Virag, who continues: ‘Once! Mud head to foot. Cut your hand open. Lockjaw. They make 
you kaput, Leopoldleben.’ Virag finally finishes ‘(with contempt) Goim nachez!’ (15.266–79) 
In her edition of the novel, Jeri Johnson translates this Yiddish phrase as a contemptible ‘The 
proud pleasure of the gentiles!’23 The whole effect of the exchange is to show that the ghost 
of Bloom’s father is not so concerned with Bloom’s future actions – there are neither 
injunctions nor commandments – but purely with Bloom’s past acts. In this sense, Virag does 
not act authoritatively and he does not deny his son the ability to see him speaking and 
watching him; in spite of the homological similarities between Ghost-Hamlet and Virag-
Bloom, Virag does not hauntologize Bloom in the way that the Ghost hauntologizes Hamlet. 
Bloom also mourns the death of his son, Rudy. The chief element of his mourning 
centres on the idea that a son provides someone to whom Bloom can pass on his inheritance. 
The memory starts with, ‘If little Rudy had lived’. This phrase implies a conditional future 
tense in which a whole counterfactual world becomes possible. However, this future is denied 
both to Bloom and Rudy; as such, so is the power of Bloom as memory eikon:24 he will not 
become a memory for his son to draw on. Memory fails with the failure of the son to survive 
the father. 
However, it becomes clear that this counterfactual, ghostly Rudy is able to 
hauntologize Bloom: ‘See him grow up. Hear his voice in the house. Walking beside Molly 
in an Eton suit. My son. Me in his eyes.’ (6.74–6) It would be easy to draw analogies 
between Hamlet’s Ghost and Bloom: both figures seek anachronic futurity in their sons; both 
are connected to the ocular or spectral blindness, as Bloom here sees not Rudy’s eyes, but his 
own eyes in Rudy’s (which also connects to anachrony). Both figures are also, in their 
connections with their sons, in a relationship with death or non-being: the Ghost is the return 
of a dead figure, whilst Bloom imagines the restoration of his own dead son. In this last idea, 
the homological connection between the Ghost, Bloom and Hamlet breaks down, however, 
for Bloom is never able to give the law to his son: Rudy is dead while Bloom lives. However, 
if the anachrony is reversed, then hauntology reappears: Rudy hauntologizes Bloom 
according to the three features of hauntology enumerated above. 
As with Virag, Rudy also appears to Bloom in ‘Circe’. Unlike his grandfather, this 
younger ‘Rudolph Bloom’ does not speak. Instead, Bloom watches him. The 
ghost’s/memory’s clothes are again important, but so are his eyes: 
RUDY 
([…] Against the dark wall a figure appears slowly, a fairy boy of eleven, a changeling, 
kidnapped, dressed in an Eton suit with glass shoes and little bronze helmet, holding a 
book in his hand. He reads from right to left inaudibly, smiling, kissing the page.) 
 
BLOOM 
(wonderstruck, calls inaudibly) Rudy! 
 
RUDY 
(gazes, unseeing, into Bloom’s eyes and goes on reading, kissing, smiling. He has a 
delicate mauve face. On his suit he has diamond and ruby buttons. In his free left hand 
he holds a slim ivory cane with a violet bowknot. A white lambkin peeps out of his 
waistcoat pocket.) (15.4956–67) 
Two things merit focus in this passage. The first is Rudy’s reading backwards, it appears, 
from right to left. The second is Rudy’s unseeing gaze that continues while he carries on 
reading. Both draw attention to the importance of ocularity and the notion of inheritance. 
The idea of ocularity is easily comparable with the Ghost’s relation to Hamlet. The 
unseeing gaze is as it is seen by Bloom, and therefore it is unclear whether the ghost of Rudy 
sees Bloom or not. And yet, Rudy is also using his eyes to read; he is in ocular control. What 
he reads, I argue, is an authoritative Jewish text, for which reason he reads the Hebraic text 
from right to left. Rudy’s kissing the page is a Joycean interpolation which does not quite 
reflect Judaic practice.25 Nevertheless, the implication is clear: Rudy’s practice indicates the 
reinstitution of the authoritative Judaic word which Bloom has been ignoring. 
The hauntological process appears to be complete: Rudy is anachronically haunting 
Bloom from the position of a younger generation that is now past; he is also denying Bloom 
the satisfaction of knowing whether or not he is looking at Bloom. And it appears that Rudy 
is giving the Jewish law back to Bloom. Indeed, Neil Davison sees in moments such as this 
an opportunity for Bloom to reinvigorate his role as ‘Jewish father’26 – something he 
performs in looking after Stephen Dedalus, ironically in ‘orthodox Samaritan fashion’ (16.3). 
Whilst Catherine Hezser contests Davison’s idea that Bloom re-commits to Judaism, 
particularly given that in ‘the following chapters, [… Bloom] repeatedly renounces his 
Jewishness’,27 Hezser’s position ignores the nuance of Davison’s argument that to identify as 
Jewish, for Bloom, was to identify positively as an outsider, rather than passively accept the 
objectification from characters such as the Citizen in ‘Cyclops’. Rudy’s hauntological 
appearance at the end of the ‘Circe’ episode precedes Bloom’s charitable fatherliness towards 
Stephen, narrated in ‘Eumaeus’ which follows. Rudy, in this sense, brings Bloom back to life 
when reminding him of his mortality. 
And so, on two separate occasions, ghosts appear to Bloom in ‘Circe’ who originally 
spring to mind in “Hades”. Moreover, there are clear connections between their appearances 
in these scenes: Virag’s yellow streaked face; Rudy’s dressing in an Eton suit. I stress this to 
show the specific connections that these moments have, rather than the myriad other 
references in Ulysses to Virag and Rudy. However, as I have shown, Virag’s appearance, 
although homologically closer to the Ghost-Hamlet relationship than Rudy-Bloom, is less 
hauntological than the latter. This reveals one of the transformations that Joyce’s text makes 
to Shakespeare’s tragedy: a generational movement that enacts an anachronic shift from the 
power of the dead father to the power of the dead son. 
Bloom’s Revival 
Neither of the memories of Bloom’s relatives emerge from a moment of mournfulness, even 
if they are themselves sad. For example, Bloom’s memory of Rudy is inspired not by 
thoughts of death or childhood mortality, but rather by a moment of respect for Simon 
Dedalus in the latter’s concern for his son: 
 – I won’t have her bastard of a nephew ruin my son. A counterjumper’s son. Selling 
tapes in my cousin, Peter Paul M’Swiney’s. Not likely. 
 He ceased. Mr Bloom glanced from his angry moustache to Mr Power’s mild face 
and Martin Cunningham’s eyes and beard, gravely shaking. Noisy selfwilled man. Full 
of his son. He is right. Something to hand on. (6.70–4)  
This grudging respect for Simon and his demanding behaviour for his son compels Bloom to 
think about the future that might have been for Rudy. Inheritance is central in this interaction. 
Bloom’s memories about his father in “Hades” are also triggered by one of the 
Dubliners in the carriage with him. Rather than Simon Dedalus, the focus is now on Martin 
Cunningham: ‘Mr Bloom, about to speak, closed his lips again. Martin Cunningham’s large 
eyes. Looking away now. Sympathetic human man he is. Intelligent. Like Shakespeare’s 
face. Always a good word to say’ (6.343–5). Martin Cunningham is subtly alluded to as a 
friend of Bloom’s who knows more than the others in the carriage about Bloom’s personal 
history (a point stressed at 6.526 ff.).28 
Moreover, whilst both memories are triggered by a moment of inspiration inside the 
carriage, the future-memory of Rudy inspires a yet more positive outlook from Bloom, since 
he starts thinking about how Rudy was conceived: 
Must have been that morning in Raymond terrace she was at the window watching the 
two dogs at it by the wall of the cease to do evil. And the sergeant grinning up. She had 
that cream gown on with the rip she never stitched. Give us a touch, Poldy. God. I’m 
dying for it. How life begins. (6.77–81)  
Behind the ghost of the dead Rudy stands the memory of Rudy’s beginning. This shows that 
Bloom’s journey through Hades may be contaminated by a host of ghosts and goblins, but 
can always return to life and living given the right circumstances. That the memory of his 
father does not return Bloom to thoughts of life shows the greater potency of Rudy’s memory 
over Virag’s: Rudy is the hauntologizing ghost from whom Bloom inherits. 
Bloom’s revival should not just be thought of as a personal action, despite Kerri 
Haggart’s rightful claim that ‘Throughout [Hades] it is clear that Bloom’s concerns lie within 
the domestic realm’ and that ‘These thoughts are individual to’ Bloom.29 By taking into 
account Halbwach’s ideas of communal memory, Bloom’s role as a Dublin citizen, even in 
“Hades”, becomes clearer. When Halbwachs argues that the idea of absolute individual 
memory is a fallacy, he urges that ‘We appeal to witnesses to corroborate or invalidate as 
well as supplement what we somehow know already about an event’. Moreover, referencing 
an analogical transfer between the self and the other, he writes that when remembering 
collectively, ‘It is as if we were comparing the testimony of several witnesses’.30 Halbwachs 
explains his rationale in greater detail: ‘Our memories remain collective […] and are recalled 
to us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things 
concerned. In reality, we are never alone.’ For example, ‘Many impressions of my first visit 
to London […] reminded me of Dickens’ novels read in childhood, so I took my walk with 
Dickens. In each of these moments I cannot say that I was alone, that I reflected alone’.31 
Even when physically alone, therefore, Halbwachs’ individual is never sociologically 
isolated. Luke Gibbons’ argument bears this out in Joyce more generally: 
Joyce maintains the openness to external promptings found in Proust’s involuntary 
memory, but there is also a sense in which they come from within: not from within the 
self, as in Freud, but from the unrequited pasts of a culture. Hidden pasts may lie outside 
the realm of the self, but this is only to say they lie in other selves, in the intersubjectivity 
of shared pasts and cultural memory.32 
These ideas are applicable to Bloom. Not only are his memories conditioned by others’ 
presence – Boots, coroner, Rudy and Molly – but the memories are summoned to presence by 
collective, social triggers. The first of these communities is that of the ‘spirit world’, as 
Benstock noted above. On his journey, Bloom encounters his own memories, but also comes 
across a series of others’ memories of loved ones and late friends. Additionally, even those in 
the carriage, let alone those at the graveyard, make mention of memories, or trigger Bloom’s 
memories of Rudy and Virag. 
A case in point is Martin Cunningham, whose amiable, Shakespearean face twice 
prompts Bloom to open up to his emotions of mourning. On the first occasion, as I have 
quoted, Bloom can only examine Simon Dedalus’ moustache and Jack Power’s ‘mild face’; 
however, when he turns to Martin, he is able to connect with his eyes. On the second 
occasion, Bloom pinpoints Martin Cunningham’s ‘large eyes’ before they look away. These 
ocular moments remind the reader of the importance of the visual connection, and show what 
it is that Bloom is after: to look someone in the eyes. This is a motif throughout Ulysses, with 
Gibbons arguing that there is a special intimacy accorded to those who can converse through 
looking in one another’s eyes.33 However, in neither of the memories does Bloom achieve 
this, though he comes close with Rudy: ‘Me in his eyes.’ In this, notwithstanding Bloom’s 
desire to imagine how Rudy would look, Bloom fails to hauntologize Rudy. He gets further 
in Rudy’s ghostly appearance in ‘Circe’ when Rudy ‘gazes unseeing’ – on this occasion, 
however, the subjective ocularity is Rudy’s obligation as he hauntologizes Bloom. 
These ideas confirm that, though mourning for his son and father, Bloom chases the 
living gaze to help him return to life. They additionally show that, although Bloom is made to 
feel unwelcome at certain points in “Hades” – such as when John Henry Menton curtly 
thanks Bloom for pointing out the dint in his hat (6.1026) – his fellow Dubliners do see him 
as a member of their community, albeit on the fringe. Just as they collectively trigger his 
memories, he becomes constitutive of theirs, merely by being a part of the social ritual that 
constitutes the funeral. Bloom equally becomes part of the community of dead in whose 
presence he now stands.34 Walking round the cemetery causes Bloom to pause and wonder: 
‘How many! […] Besides how could you remember everybody?’ (6.960–2) In response, as 
he heads through the cemetery, Bloom seeks ever-more outlandish strategies for 
remembering. These strategies recreate the hauntological effect that has energised Bloom, 
and restore his agency that hauntology would remove. 
Technological Strategies 
Derrida labels Hamlet’s Ghost’s armour a ‘technical prosthesis, a body foreign to the spectral 
body that it dresses, dissimulates, and protects, masking even its identity’.35 The 
supplementary aspect of the armour adds a layer to the spirit – which might not even be there 
– and adds to the Ghost’s general dissimulation. But the armour also gives the Ghost material 
form. In this way, it is both suspicious, but a necessary factor in the Ghost’s hauntology. It 
also signals to Hamlet that the Ghost is between the spiritual and profane worlds. As I will 
show, Bloom himself considers technical prostheses to help maintain the living with the dead, 
whilst never fully restoring them to life. He does this in order to reproduce artificially the 
process of hauntology that so energises him. 
It is first important to note the subtle suspicion of old technology in “Hades”. 
Commenting on the pointsmen who work the tramlines, Bloom wonders: ‘Couldn’t they 
invent something automatic so that the wheel itself much handier?’ He answers his own 
enquiry: ‘Well, but that fellow would lose his job then? Well but then another fellow would 
get a job making the new invention?’ (6.175–9) Later in the chapter, Bloom additionally 
complains about hearts and their fallibility: ‘A pump after all, pumping thousands of gallons 
of blood every day. One fine day it gets bunged up: and there you are. Lots of them lying 
around here: lungs hearts, livers. Old rusty pumps: damn the thing else.’ (6.674–6) In the 
former passage, Bloom is an economic industrialist, seeing in new technology the possibility 
of new economies and therefore new employment; hence his veneration. In the latter passage, 
by contrast, older technology is considered second rate and frail, and its failing leads directly 
to death. 
If Bloom is to be considered a latter-day Hamlet, then the technical prostheses he 
seeks in Glasnevin to counter the ‘rusty pumps’ must maintain the liminality of being; or, in 
Gibbons’ terms, they must ‘play with the persistence of the ghost under modernity’.36 
Bloom’s first idea focuses on the voice – that medium of authority that the Ghost uses to 
command Hamlet. 
Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. Have a gramophone in every grave or keep it in the 
house. After dinner on a Sunday. Put on poor old greatgrandfather. Kraahraark! 
Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullygladaseeagain hellohello amawf krpthsth. 
(6.962–6)  
This comical moment considers a technology that would allow the dead to appear after their 
death via their voice.37 Confusingly, Bloom imagines that the speaking voice would 
illogically say that it is ‘awfullygladaseeagain’ (my emphasis): it would imply that it can see 
those to whom it is talking, despite that obvious impossibility. Once more, the ocular is 
joined with the spectral voice, thereby intensifying its hauntological power. 
Moreover, Bloom’s suggested use of the gramophone record is identical to some of 
the earliest analogies of memorial storage. Plato’s Socrates instructs in Theaetetus to 
envisage the mind as ‘wax’ on which memory is imprinted ‘as we might stamp the 
impression of a seal ring’.38 This imprint is the tupos of memory.39 Just as the wax tablet is a 
representation of the space for memory, so the waxen record is a technological storage space; 
the difference lies in the personal accessibility of the former and the communal accessibility 
of the latter, and perfectly analogises Halbwach’s ideas about the impossibility of individual 
memory – all memory is collective. Though Fritz Senn criticises Bloom’s choice of 
gramophone,40 the deficiencies Senn highlights are central to the hauntological experience 
that Bloom recreates. Technically, the voice presents an absence to the collective, rendering 
the dead person indeterminate between life and death, ‘ontologiz[ing] remains, to make them 
present’.41 
Bloom proceeds to think carefully about the visibility of those brought back to life by 
technical prostheses. He continues: ‘Remind you of the voice like the photograph reminds 
you of the face. Otherwise you couldn’t remember the face after fifteen years, say.’42 (6.966–
8) At the heart of Bloom’s strategy is the bid to avoid forgetting other people – to avoid 
oblivion. It is as if he, as well as Hamlet, has received the injunction from the Ghost. As with 
the record the photograph is a mediated form of memory which is both distinct from that 
which or whom it memorialises – it is only a ‘remind[er]’ of the dead person’s face – and yet 
its mediated nature renders it immemorial because it relies on no living being in order to 
exist. Highlighting the deathly aspect of the photograph, Maud Ellmann writes that ‘Through 
the photographic image we survive the grave but also die before our death, disenfleshed 
before our hearts have ceased to beat’.43 Roland Barthes’ (1980) meditation on photography 
corroborates this idea of the photograph’s intimate relation to death. Not only in the 
photograph ‘taken of me’ does Barthes reveal that ‘Death is the eidos’ but also any 
photograph that acts as replacement for the monument has as its punctum – ‘A photograph’s 
punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).’44 – the 
idea that 
he is going to die. I read at the same time: This will be and this has been; I observe with 
horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. […] Whether or not the subject is 
already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe.45 
With this indeterminate temporality and liminal occupation between life and death, Bloom’s 
ideas approach a man-inspired hauntology.46 Gibbons writes that in revolutionary Ireland, 
‘Holding on to the now and then in one frame, the capacity of the photograph to suspend the 
flow of time opens up the present to unrequited pasts, re-connecting with other narratives’ – 
i.e. with other futures.47 Ellen Carol Jones corroborates this idea when she argues that 
‘Joyce’s texts examine how public “memory” is created by projecting a future not yet 
realized – a projection that is, paradoxically, also a ‘retrospective arrangement”’.48 The 
spectres raised in the record and photograph are both temporally and spatially liminal, and it 
is at this juncture that the individual memory transfers into a collectively accessible 
consciousness.49 This archive, as it were, would enable the dead to hauntologize everyone in 
Dublin. It also validates my theory of the memorial intertext – Hamlet in this case – 
hauntologizing Ulysses. Ellmann’s conclusion to all of this is salient here for a number of 
reasons: ‘To be or not to be is no longer the question.’50  
Conclusion: Being and Non-Being 
I argue that the question has transformed in Bloom’s mind into a definitive statement: ‘To be, 
and not to be.’ The shift from ‘or’ to ‘and’ mirrors Bloom’s fascination with the 
technological prostheses that render the memorial ghosts both dead and living at once. This 
eases his mourning, apparently, and though Bloom leaves the cemetery still separate from his 
fellow Dubliners (6.1027–8), he does so with renewed vitality: ‘The gates glimmered in 
front: still open. Back to the world again. […] How grand we are this morning! (6.995–1033) 
Whereas Hamlet’s relationship with the Ghost led to his reduced agency, Bloom’s 
consideration of technological prostheses restores his agency in spite of the imbalanced 
hauntology. The opportunity to access more readily and create collective memory puts a 
spring in Bloom’s step.  
This shift from questionable ‘or’ to liminal ‘and’ is theorized in Søren Kierkegaard’s 
1843 ‘Either/Or’ essay. Kierkegaard’s ‘A’ analogises it through agricultural cultivation, 
claiming that when the land’s potential for growth and harvest is considered, ‘every particular 
change still falls under the universal rule of the relation between recollecting and 
forgetting.’51 It is important to ask whether it is possible to choose both recollecting and 
forgetting: whether in forgetting the liveliness of people, they can still be re-membered back 
into the world. In answer to this question, Kierkegaard writes: 
But what is it, then, that I choose – is it this or that? No, for I choose absolutely, and I 
choose absolutely precisely by having chosen not to choose this or that. I choose the 
absolute, and what is the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity.52 
In Bloom’s choice to have the dead nearly living, and therefore both dead and alive at the 
same time, he maintains his own potential for being in his ‘eternal validity’. Bloom’s 
predilection for liminality in “Hades” maintains his own potentiality, his own liminality, 
though with the stress on his inability to die absolutely, rather than the ability to be brought 
back to life.53 He, like the ghosts he revives, becomes liminal in his remembering: he 
partially joins the community of the dead, just as they are summoned to meet him. 
Kierkegaard describes a position such as Bloom’s as ‘remember[ing] poetically’,54 a 
process which prevents nostalgia – the painful return of memories. Since mourning is a 
process in which painful memories return, it is possible to equate ‘remembering poetically’ 
with completing the work of mourning. Here hauntology is seen to expedite mourning. 
Critically, remembering poetically is not the same as writing poetry. Rather, it needs to be 
considered as closer to an ethic of poiesis. In Plato’s Symposium Diotima schools Socrates in 
Eros and the love of absolute beauty. An analogy for erotic love is poiesis, through which 
Diotima explains how ‘“There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All 
creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art 
are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers”’.55 A commitment to poiesis is a 
commitment to perpetual becoming, to thriving in liminality between being and non-being, 
life and death, the past servicing the future – a commitment to ‘eternal validity’. Poiesis, 
though similar to the classical idea of tekhnè – an art or skill more concerned with end 
product than process56 – differs in the idea of mediation. John Frow sees in tekhnè and 
technological forms of memory a mediation that implies ‘institutional conditions of 
existence’.57 To suggest that the photograph and record are ‘Monuments of unageing 
intellect’, to quote Yeats’ ‘Sailing to Byzantium’,58 renders them static, ignoring their 
potential for maintaining potential (just as with the Ghost’s visor): their poiesis. 
And so, to suggest that Bloom is remembering poetically changes the common 
perception of him. Bloom is nominally considered the Everyman in Ulysses, to Stephen’s 
poet-hero; Stephen is often compared to Hamlet. However, in this article, I have shown that 
Bloom is Hamletic through his poietic mourning which in “Hades” is overcome by more, not 
less death; but death that, in being brought back to life, hauntologizes Bloom. The 
technological prostheses of the record and the photograph represent versions of remembering 
poetically that allow the representation of those long dead to those who still live. This 
hauntology is exemplified in “Hades”, but is valid throughout the novel, and is even 
cemented by the appearance of the ghosts of Bloom’s father and son in ‘Circe’. 
Finally, Bloom’s comical (though nevertheless important) memorial methods which 
allow for the production of a communal archive59 reassert his importance to the Dublin 
community. He is the ‘passive and caring person’ who ‘achieves a sort of semi-divine status, 
at once victim and god, by a sort of anonymous celebrity’. And so, Bloom avoids 
‘massification, [… i.e.] being lost in the crowd’ and becomes the poietic Everyman.60 
Memory is at the heart of that role. Bloom remembers his father and son; the night terrors of 
‘Circe’ remember the daytime desires of “Hades”; Glasnevin remembers the dead; and 
Bloom remembers Hamlet. Hamlet, of course, remembers the Ghost, who is the emblematic 
figure for the life-giving force of hauntology. In and through these memories, Bloom 
becomes eternally valid to his fellow Dubliners, and to Ulysses’ readers. 
Memory, understood in this way both as intertext and impetus for personal life, is 
present in “Hades”, in spite of its explicit absences. In fact, “Hades” gives the model of 
memory for Ulysses as a whole and shows that the dead – be they dead texts or dead 
characters – still constitute an irrepressible and necessary part of Ulysses. 
One final thought. As I have shown, anachrony and ‘time [being] out of joint’ is 
characteristic of all of the above analyses: a dead past is giving the law to the living present. 
It is important also to pay attention to the role of the anachronic future in hauntology. 
Importantly, through the poietic technology, Bloom would create an ‘eternal validity’ – the 
revenant dead would survive ad infinitum. Just as Rudy and Virag appear again in ‘Circe’, as 
if thrown forward in the text from “Hades”, so too would Bloom’s communally accessible 
archive of memory be available in the future. Rudy’s hauntology of Bloom allows the latter 
to consider a method of surviving into the future without the more natural opportunities that 
patrilineal inheritance affords. In this final sense, memory in “Hades” is not just about 
reviving the past or summoning up ghosts of the dead, but also about remembering faultlessly 
into the future – via a liminal, eternal existence. 
Table 1. Frequency of lexical field of memory in Ulysses and “Hades” 
Word Frequency in Ulysses Frequency in “Hades” 
Remember 75 5 
Remembers 25 0 
Remembered 0 0 
Remembering 6 1 
Memory 37 1 
Memories 6 0 
Recall 7 0 
Recalled 3 0 
Table 2. Rank order of episodes in Ulysses according to frequency of ‘remember’ 
Rank Chapter Frequency 
1 
‘Sirens’ 9 
‘Circe’ 9 
‘Penelope’ 9 
4 ‘Lestrygonians’ 7 
5 
“Hades” 5 
‘Nausicaa’ 5 
7 
‘Telemachus’ 4 
‘Oxen of the Sun’ 4 
‘Eumaeus’ 4 
10 
‘Proteus’ 3 
‘Calypso’ 3 
‘Lotus Eaters’ 3 
‘Cyclops’ 3 
14 
‘Aeolus 2 
‘Scylla and Charybdis 2 
16 
‘Nestor’ 1 
‘Wandering Rocks’ 1 
‘Ithaca’ 1 
Notes 
1. Bloom’s chapters include: “Calypso”, “Lotus Eaters”, “Hades”, “Aeolus”, “Lestrygonians”, “Scylla 
and Charybdis”, “Wandering Rocks”, “Sirens”, “Cyclops”, “Nausicaa”, “Oxen of the Sun”, 
“Circe”, “Eumaeus” and “Ithaca”. 
2. As Renate Lachmann argues, ‘“Intertextuality” is the term conceived in literary scholarship to 
capture this interchange and contact, formal and semantic, between texts – literary and non-
literary. Intertextuality demonstrates the process by which a culture, where “culture” is a book 
culture, continually rewrites and retranscribes itself, constantly redefining itself through its signs. 
Every concrete text, as a sketched-out memory space, connotes the macrospace of memory that 
either represents a culture or appears as that culture’ (Lachmann, “Mnemonic and Intertextual 
Aspects of Literature,” 301). 
3. Williams, Marxism and Literature, 132. 
4. Royle, The Uncanny, 280. 
5. The term καταβασις, katabasis, more exactly describes the visit to the underworld, but nekuya is 
used as a generic term for summoning and conversing with the dead. 
6. Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 85. 
7. Kenner, “Joyce’s Ulysses,” 98. 
8. Shakespeare, Hamlet, I.II.76–86. Further references will be to this edition and cited parenthetically 
in the main text. 
9. Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) was a French Humanist whose ideas were distinctly protestant in 
character. I argue in my forthcoming monograph that as a student at Wittenberg, Hamlet learnt the 
Ramist dialectic. Though Ramus says nothing specifically in terms of memory, his ‘topical 
classifications’ are nevertheless ‘classifications-for-recall, so that working with them is of itself 
working with a memory device’ (Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, 213). Hamlet’s 
response to the Ghost’s injunctions can therefore be seen as memorial practices that Hamlet had 
learnt at university. 
                                                
                                                                                                                                                  
10. Though of course the Ghost’s singularity is repeated, as is obvious in the text and is accounted for 
in Derrida’s argument. See Derrida, Specters of Marx, 10. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid., 6; 6–7; 9.  
13. Ibid., 7. 
14. Ibid., 8. 
15. Ibid., 9. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Consider Hamlet’s ‘Must I remember?’ (I.II.143) when he is explaining the power of his mourning 
and its relation to his mother’s hasty remarriage. 
18. Adams, “Hades,” 99. 
19. Joyce, Ulysses, 6.1000–1. Further references to this edition will be cited parenthetically in the 
main text. 
20. By spectrality, I describe the living character’s encounter with a ghost or ghosts. 
21. Benstock, “Ulysses as Ghoststory,” 409. 
22. See Marcel Proust in Steinberg, The Stream-of-Consciousness Technique, 87.: ‘[A] fragment of 
life in unsullied preservation […] which asked only that it should be set free, that it should come 
and augment my wealth of life and poetry.’  
23. This quoted from Johnson (ed.), Ulysses, 417.12n. 
24. Paul Ricoeur notes ‘the Platonic theory of the eikon places the main emphasis on the phenomenon 
of the presence of an absent thing, the reference to past time remaining implicit’ (Memory, History, 
Forgetting, 6). 
25. It is common to kiss the prayer book if it has been dropped on the floor, and when closing the 
book at the end of a prayer service. It is also customary to use the fringes of the prayer shawl to 
touch the Torah parchment prior to kissing the fringes upon reading the Torah during communal 
services. 
26. Davison, Joyce, ‘Ulysses’, and the Construction of Jewish Identity, 228. 
                                                                                                                                                  
27. Hezser, ““Are You Protestant Jews or Roman Catholic Jews?”,” 179. For example, see 16.1082–
5, 16.1119–20 and 17.530–1. 
28. See Crispi, “The Genesis of Leopold Bloom,” 22. 
29. Haggart, “Crustcrumbs in the Carriage,” 351; 345. 
30. Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 22. My emphasis. 
31. Ibid., 23. 
32. Gibbons, Joyce’s Ghosts, 75. Emphasis in original. 
33. Ibid., 46–7. Gibbons also analogises this with the reader’s relation to the text she reads: she must 
look for Dublin’s and Ulysses’ returned gaze – i.e. get to know its character by reading it.  
34. It is therefore reminiscent of Gabriel Conroy’s awkward welcome into the community of spirits in 
Joyce’s story, ‘The Dead’: ‘[I]n the partial darkness he imagined he saw the form of a young man 
standing under a dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region where 
dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of, but could not apprehend, their wayward and 
flickering existence. His own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid world 
itself which these dead had one time reared and lived in, was dissolving and dwindling.’ Joyce, 
Dubliners, 160. 
35. Derrida, Specters of Marx, 7. 
36. Gibbons, Joyce’s Ghosts, 7. My emphasis. 
37. In this sense, Gibbons cites Steven Connor’s argument that since the gramophone voice ‘is not 
live […] Bloom’s imagining of a conversation from the grave is closer to a telephone than a 
gramophone’ (ibid., 8). This correction emphasises the asymmetry of the encounter in “Hades”. 
38. Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 191c-191e; cf. Cicero, De Oratore, 219, who also uses 
the wax impression analogy.  
39. See Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 8. 
40. ‘The inconsistencies are grotesque. Also, the greatgranfather [sic] could neither have hoped to see 
his listeners nor take any pleasure from this communication, since he was already dead.’ Senn, 
Annotations to James Joyce, 233–4. 
41. Derrida, Specters of Marx, 9. 
                                                                                                                                                  
42. Gibbons additionally goes so far as to argue that Rudy’s appearance in ‘Circe’ links to 
contemporary interest in ‘spirit photography’. See Gibbons, Joyce’s Ghosts, 159–64. 
43. Ellmann, “The Ghosts of Ulysses,” 83.  
44. Barthes, Camera Lucida, 15; 27. 
45. Ibid., 96. 
46. This strategy also circumvents the dangers of the failure of involuntary memory, when ‘we cannot 
give a name to the sensation, or call on it, and it does not come alive’. Proust in Steinberg, The 
Stream-of-Consciousness Technique, 87. 
47. Gibbons, “Time Transfixed,” 15. 
48. Jones, “History’s Ghosts,” 4. 
49. It is also worth emphasising that Virag’s and Rudy’s appearances in ‘Circe’ adhere to this 
temporal displacement by appearing in the same accoutrements much later in the novel than their 
reference point in “Hades”. 
50. Ellmann, “The Ghosts of Ulysses,” 83. 
51. Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, 56. Emphasis in original. 
52. Ibid., 79. 
53. There are twin liminal positions: the dead are made liminal when being brought back to near-life 
through technology; the living are made liminal when absolute death (i.e. oblivion) is denied to 
them. 
54. Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, 56. 
55. Plato, “Symposium,” 164 [205b-205c]. I use this edition of Plato here for its clearer enunciation of 
poiesis’ intimate relation to non-being and being. Diotima does immediately after this quotation 
specifically say that poetry – ‘music and metre’ – is necessary in order to be a poet. Nevertheless, 
my point is that Bloom adopts a poetic sensibility, in which continued generation and liminality 
are privileged. 
56. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 305. 
57. Frow, “Repetition and Forgetting,” 230. 
58. Yeats, “The Major Works,” l. 8. 
                                                                                                                                                  
59. In fact, it is possible to see socio-cultural parallels in Bloom’s strategy in the 1947 construction by 
the Republic of Ireland’s Bureau of Military History of an archive of witness testimonies of the 
revolutionary period. See Foster, Vivid Faces, 306–7. 
60. Kiberd, Ulysses and Us, 281–4. 
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